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NOTES

THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
AND THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, an international conference of plenipotentiaries was
convened by the United Nations General Assembly. The Conference, meeting at Geneva, adopted four separate conventions,
known collectively as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of
the Sea.' One of these conventions, the Convention on the Continental Shelf,2 -was designed to answer questions raised by the
newly emerging doctrine of the continental shelf. The continental shelf is a shallow platform or terrace that forms the transitional zone between dry land and the deep sea bed. The purpose
of this note is to trace the events that led to the enactment of the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and to see what effect this document has had on the national policy of the United
States concerning the continental shelf.

II. HISTORICAL DEvE op mwT
A. Freedom of the Seas
During the middle ages, many states, including Venice, Denmark and England, claimed broad rights over portions of the
high seas and by 1493, almost every major world power had
claimed some portion of the high seas. The concept of "freedom
of the high seas" grew up in opposition to this restrictive practice and by the end of the 17th century, "freedom of the high
seas" was a recognized principle of international law. The
scope of the principle was uncertain, however. No coastal state
was willing to extend this freedom up to its own coast line, and
accordingly the three concepts of internal waters, territorial
seas, and contiguous zones were developed to permit the coastal
1. These conventions were: The Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.52 (1958); The Convention
on the High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.53 (1958); The Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.54 (1958); and The Convention on the Continental
Shelf, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (1958). Also adopted was an Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.57 (1958).
2. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
13/L.55 (1958).
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state to exercise some degree of control over its coastal waters.
The degree of control varied from complete control in internal
waters to special jurisdiction for law enforcement and national
security in the contiguous zones. Today these zones are recognized by all states; however, there is disagreement over the
width of each.3
B. Early Development of the Continental Shelf Theory
The first significant development in continental shelf law was
the treaty entered into between Great Britain and Venezuela on
February 26, 1942.4 This treaty settled a controversy between
Venezuela and Trinidad over the ownership of the submarine
areas of the Gulf of Paria, which lies between these two countries. Although the disputed area was located on the South
American continental shelf, the treaty made no positive pronouncement concerning the ownership of the shelf. It was
agreed, however, to divide the disputed area in half by a boundary line midway between the two countries. The treaty expressly
provided that the superjacent waters would not be affected by
its terms.
On September 28, 1945, President Truman issued a proclamation asserting the United States' claim to its continental shelf.5
The Truman Proclamation painstakingly avoided any extension
of the territorial sea claims of the United States. 6 The document carefully stated that the United States' claim referred only
to jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the continental shelf and was in no way a claim of sovereignty over the
superjacent waters. It expressly stated that the status of the
waters (i.e. high seas) was to remain unchanged.7
3. Originally the width of the territorial sea was set at three miles. This
figure was reached on the theory that the range of a shore-based cannon only
extended to this point and that to claim any further would be to claim what
could not be controlled. The theory of cannon range was suggested by Cornelius Van Bynkerscholk, a Dutch jurist, and the distance was calculated by an
Italian, Galaini, in 1782. P. JEssuP, THE LAw oF TERRTroRiAL WATMS An D
MAI Tnrm JuRIsDIcrIo
6 (1927).
4. [1942] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 10.
5. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
6. The U.S. has historically favored narrow territorial waters.
7. Another distinction made in the U.S. pronouncement is that between
control and jurisdiction, and sovereignty. Although this distinction was later
adopted by the Geneva Convention and other nations, there is at least some
authority in favor of the position that the distinction is one without substance,
and that such claims are in reality claims to sovereignty over the submarine
areas. Young, The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Sea,
45 Am. J. INT. L. 225 (1951).
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The Truman Proclamation caused immediate reaction all over
the world and it was followed by similar declarations from a
number of different states. Unfortunately these declarations
came at a time when long running feuds over coastal fisheries
were coming to a head, and many countries used the Truman
Proclamation as an excuse to grasp considerable areas of high
seas for their own national purposes. These proclamations, in
many instances, asserted jurisdiction over not only the sea bed
but also over the superjacent waters and fisheries therein.8 The
Mexican Presidential Declaration of October 29, 1945,9 laid
claim to "the whole of the continental platform or shelf adjoining its coast line and to each and all of the natural resources
existing there." Although this declaration expressly denied any
intention to restrict the right of free navigation on the high seas,
it did assert the right to control fisheries "irrespective of their
distance from the coast." On October 11, 1946, Argentina, by
presidential decree, 10 asserted full sovereignty over the waters
and bed of its continental shelf. The decree, which subjected the
Argentine epicontinental sea and continental shelf to the sovereign power of the nation, stated that free navigation in these
areas would not be restricted; however, freedom of navigation
is but one of several freedoms long recognized as protected under
the international law principle of freedom of the high seas.11
Moreover Argentina's declaration of sovereignty was in direct
conflict with established international law, yet Argentina's
claim purported to be based on a doctrine "implicitly accepted
in modern international law". In 1917 Chile and Peru followed
the Argentine example by publishing similar presidential decrees.12 Despite vigorous worldwide protest this trend continued
and reached its high point with a triparte declaration by Chile,
Equador, and Peru - nations with virtually no continental shelf.
This declaration asserted the "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction of each over the sea that bathes the coast of their respec8. W. BIsHoP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 414-16 (1953).
9. Presidential Declaration with Respect to the Continental Shelf, 116 El

Universal No. 10, at 54 (1945).
10. Decree No. 14,708, 54 Boletin Official de la Republica Argentina No. 15,
at 641 (1946).
11. Other freedoms recognized under the theory of Freedom of the Seas are:
freedom from claims of sovereignty, freedom of emersion and freedom of flight
over the seas.
12. Presidential Declaration of June 23, 1947, 1947 El Mercurio 27; Presidential Decree No. 781, August 1, 1947, 103 El Peraano; Diano Official No. 1,
983, at 1 (1947).
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tive countries to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles from
'13
the aforesaid coast.
As a result of the wide divergence of positions taken by the
Western Nations on jurisdiction over the continental shelf, several attempts were made to formulate a uniform policy. Meetings were sponsored by the Organization of American States in
Rio de Janerio in 1950, Caracas in 1954, and Mexico City in
1956. On March 15, 1956, the Inter-American Conference on
"Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and
Marine Waters" met in Cuidad Trujello. This special conference
recognized that the sea bed and its subsoil appertained to the
coastal state and were subject to its jurisdiction and control;
however, it was unable to reach any further conclusions other
than on the definition of the continental shelf.
Several other nations also made proclamations that varied in
degree and scope. Among these nations were the Philippines,
Iceland, Great Britain, The Republic of Korea, and Australia.
By this time it had become quite evident that some attempt at
a uniform multilateral pronouncement must be made. The responsibility for this task fell to the International Law Commission which had been created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. The purpose of this commission at its inception
was to assist in the codification and progressive development of
international law.1"

Ill. TRADITIONAL

INTERNATIoAL LAW CONOEMu'S

One basic approach to the complex problem of the continental
shelf is to characterize the problem as a question of acquiring
territory. The problem can then be analyzed under traditional
concepts of territorial acquisition. Under these traditional concepts there are two alternative theories that can be pursued.
The first theory is as follows: Since the bed of the continental
shelf lies under the high sea outside the littoral states' territorial
waters, it is the property of all the people and it may not be acquired exclusively by any one state. This theory finds expression in the traditional principle of res communis. The second
theory is to the effect that the sea bed is territory without a master and is thus capable of acquisition by effective occupation.
This theory is termed res nullius.
13. 33 DEP'T STATE Buzz. 1025 (1953).
14. G.A. Res. 174, U.N. Doc. A/104 (1947).
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The debate engendered by these opposing theories has raged
between the outstanding academicians in the field of international law for many years, and the modern trend is toward the
r'es nullius theory; however, adoption of res nullius does not give
a simple solution to the problem. A blanket acceptance of the
res nullius theory would leave the international community in a
position similar to that of California during the Gold Rush of
1849. Any state technically capable of effective occupation
could claim an area of sea bed no matter how distant from its
own shores and no matter how tenuous its prior connection with
the area. Such a rule would be intolerable to most coastal states,
particularly those unable to proceed immediately with the development of their own continental shelf.
The policy considerations underlying the arguments against
res nuMlius were recognized in the case of the Anna..15 That case
involved the ownership of several mud islands that were formed
off the coast of the United States by deposits from the Mississippi River. The court, holding that the islands were the territory of the United States, said:
Consider what the consequences would be if islands of
this description were not considered as appendant to
the mainland, as comprised within the bounds of territory. If they do not belong to the United States of
America, any other power might occupy them; they
might be embanked and fortified. What a thorn would
this be in the sidd of America.16
In order to avoid the problems inherent in the res nullius rule,
one writer has suggested "general recognition by international
law of the principle that the continental shelf belongs to the
coastal state."' 7 Adoption of this position, however, would still
leave unanswered the question of ipso facto jurisdiction. Does the
coastal state's title rest on some claim by the state (notional occupation) or does it exist independent from any such actual
claim? These and other questions faced the International Law
Commission when it met for the first time in 1949.
15. The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373 (1805).

16. Id. at 385.

17. INTERNATIONAL LAw AssocrATioN REPORT OF THE 43RD CONENCE,
RIGHT TO THE SEA BED AND ITS SuBsOIL
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IV.

DEVELOPMiET Or THE GENEVA CONVENTtONS

A. The Geneva Convention
One of the first areas selected for codification by the International Law Commission was the law of the sea and after several intermediate drafts and reports, the commission adopted in
1956 a body of rules concerning the law of the sea. Since the commission's mandate covered both "codification" and "progressive
development" and in view of the difficulty of distinguishing between these two mandates, the commission proposed that an international conference be called to pass on their final product. Approving this proposal, the eleventh General Assembly of the
United Nations sponsored a conference at Geneva starting in February of 1958. Eighty-six nations attended this conference and
although a wide variety of conflicting viewpoints was presented,
four important conventions were passed. Even though some
members of the international community may never ratify these
conventions, past experience has shown that the important general
principles of these conventions will be followed as a matter of
reciprocity.
B. Article I.
Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf' 8 contains
a definition of the Continental Shelf reached after much discussion and compromise. The text reads as follows:
For the purpose of these articles the term "continental
shelf" is used as referring (a) to the sea bed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters
or, beyond the limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploration of natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the sea bed and subsoil
of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
islands.19

By comparing this final version with the several International
Law Commission drafts that preceded it, one can clearly follow
the debate and compromise that took place. In the 1951 draft no
mention was made of a specific depth but rather the ability to explore the sea bed and subsoil marked the outer limit of the shelf.
18. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (1958).
19. Id. at 1.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss1/4

6

Scott: The Continental Shelf and the United States
[Vol.
SOUTH CAROLiNA LAW REvmW

22

A state could claim as far out as it was technically capable of exploring. The 1953 draft abandoned this test in favor of a, static
depth of 200 meters. The 1956 draft, on which the Geneva Convention was based, adopted both tests in the alternative. At the
time of the final drafting, 200 meters was considered the outside
limit for advancement in technical capability for undersea exploration and development during the next 20 years ;20 however,
this estimate was grossly inaccurate. Offshore drilling is now
technically possible at depths of up to 1,000 feet.
0. Article II
Article II of the convention reads as follows:
1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of the article
are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state does
not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities, or
make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal state.
3. The rights of the coastal state over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles
consist of the mineral and other nonliving resources
of sea bed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species, that is on or under the
sea bed or are unable to move except in constant phy21
sical contact with the sea bed or the subsoil.
Probably the most controversial subject in international law today is the distinction between sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction and control. In the 1951 International Law Commission draft, the power of the coastal state over its shelf was defined in terms of "control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and its natural resources. 2 2 The 1953 draft used the
20. M. Mounton, Recent Developments in the Technology of Exploiting the
Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/25
(1958).
21. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55, at 1 (1954).
22. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 at
18 (1951).
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language "sovereign right for the purpose of exploring and exploiting .... ,123 The 1956. draft was identical to the 1953 draft
in this regard and the commentary prepared by the International
Law Commission explained the reasons for the language change.
The Commission desired to avoid language lending itself to interpretations alien to an object which the commission considers to be of decisive importance, namely,
the safeguarding of the principle of the full freedom of
the superjacent sea and the airspace above it. Hence it
was unwilling to accept the sovereignty of the coastal
state over the sea bed and subsoil of the continental
shelf. On the other hand the text as now adopted leaves
no doubt that the rights conferred upon the coastal state
cover all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the
continental shelf. Such rights include jurisdiction in
connection with the prevention and punishment of violations of the law. The rights of the coastal state are
exclusive in the sense that, if it does not exploit the continental shelf, it is only with its consent that anyone else
may do so.24
Some states had hoped that the rights granted in the continental shelf would extend the coastal state's jurisdiction over the superjacent waters and the airspace above. However, the United
States and several other nations favored a wording that would
leave no doubt that freedom of the superjacent waters and airspace was to be safeguarded. Accordingly, the United States proposed to modify the 1956 International Law Commission draft
by deleting the word "sovereign" and in its place inserting the
word "exclusive". The article in its pertinent part would then
read:
The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf
excZusive rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources. (emphasis added)
In introducing this proposal, the United States' delegation made
it clear that it was opposed to any wording that would cast the
slightest doubt on the free status of the superjacent seas and airspace. After much debate and several counter proposals, the
23. Id. at 12.
24. Int'l L. Coxnm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858
(1951).
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United State's proposed draft was finally passed by the narrow
margin of 21 to 20. At a later session, however, after it became
evident that no move to subject the superjacent waters and airspace to state sovereignty would be successful, the United States
receded from its former position in order to obtain wider support
for this article in the international community. Thus the wording "sovereign rights" as found in the 1956 International Law
Commission was accepted in the final Geneva draft.
The final draft of the Geneva Convention draws a distinction
between jurisdiction and control over the resources of the continental shelf and sovereignty over the shelf itself, and in doing
so creates a new legal concept - limited sovereignty. That is to
say that a state may have sovereign rights for certain purposes in
a certain area without having sovereignty over the area. By
drawing this distinction the convention was able to maintain the
freedom of the superjacent waters and airspace and at the same
time permit the coastal state to exercise exclusive control over the
resources of its continental shelf. As previously pointed out,2 5
however, there is an argument that any distinction between
sovereign (or exclusive) rights in the resources of the continental
shelf and complete sovereignty over the shelf itself is a meaningless one. It is argued that the minimum intent is to control exclusively the resources of the shelf and that as a practical matter
it is impossible to control the resources without also controlling
the shelf itself. In other words, what is being attempted is the
exercise of all those powers customarily thought of as accompanying sovereignty. The exercise of these powers, however, is not
made under the name of sovereignty. But is it possible to exert
such complete and exclusive control without in fact having
sovereignty? Sovereignty being a matter of exclusive control and
jurisdiction, the distinction, it is argued, is nonexistent. One reason for the attempted distinction that is perhaps unique to the
United States is constitutionality. The United States has always
been a leader in the fight for the limitation of off-shore claims.
In all her declarations and proposals extreme caution has been
taken to avoid any possible interpretation of these statements as
an extension of national domain. This caution has been attributed to the constitutional requirement that congressional approval is necessary before new territories may be acquired by the
United States.
25. See discussion at note 7 supra.
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Although the distinction between "sovereign powers" and
"sovereignty" has for the most part been accepted by the international community, the dictinction is extremely tenuous and it is
difficult to view these claims as anything other than a pure and
simple expansion of national dominion. Moreover, the convention
at no point prohibits broader claims of sovereignty completely
unrelated to natural resources. This inadequacy is important in
view of the fact that both before and after the conference many
states, including the United States, have made broad claims of
plenary jurisdiction and control amounting to sovereignty over
the shelf, although carefully avoiding usage of the word.
V. UNITED STATES NATiONAL

PoviOy

A. Generally
Basically there are four areas of consideration regarding the
United States' national policy concerning the continental shelf.
These areas are: The Truman Proclamation, 20 The Submerged
Lands Act, 27 The Outer Continental Shelf Land Act,28 and the

case law that has grown up around these pronouncements.
B. Truman Proclamation
In 1945, the Truman Proclamation asserted the jurisdiction
and control of the United States over the resources of the subsoil
and sea bed of its continental shelf but carefully avoided any extension of its territorial limits. Although the proclamation did
not define the continental shelf, an accompanying press release
described it as "submerged land which is contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no more than 100 fathoms of
water."2 9
C. The Submerged Lands Act
Roughly 15 years before the issuance of the Truman Proclamation, the question of ownership of the submerged lands within the
territorial waters of the United States arose in a California case.
California claimed the oil and gas rights in portions of this area
and began leasing to private concerns. The Federal Government
initiated a suit against California and subsequently against
26. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
27. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964).

28. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).
29. 13 DEr'T STATE Bum.. 484 (1945).
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Louisiana and Texas. The United States Supreme Court held
that California, Louisiana and Texas had no title or property interest in the submerged lands and that the Federal Government
had full dominion over the lands. In reaction to this decision, the
United States Congress in 1953 passed the Submerged Lands Act,
which vested in the coastal states ownership of "lands beneath
navigable waters" within their respective historical boundaries.
The term, "lands beneath navigable water" was defined as all submerged land lying between the three mile territorial limit and
states' historical boundaries (the boundaries that existed when a
state was admitted to the Union).
Prior to the passage of the Submerged Lands Act in 1953, no
authority existed for the leasing of oil and gas rights in the submerged lands of the United States' continental shelf. President
Truman's proclamation of 1945 had merely asserted jurisdiction
and control over the natural resources and said nothing of their
utilization. The power to authorize such utilization was vested in
the Congress of the United States and not in the President. The
Submerged Lands Act filled in this gap somewhat but the question of leasing procedure in the area outside the three mile limit
still remained unanswered.
D. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act applies only to the
subsoil and sea bed of that part of the continental shelf lying beyond the territorial limits of the United States. The Act claims
exclusive jurisdiction and control for the United States' Federal
Government over the outer continental shelf as far as international law will permit (i.e., the Congress purposely did not specify how far the shelf should extend, but rather left the definition
of the continental shelf open-ended and flexible). The act provides that the waters above the continental shelf are to retain
their character as high seas and that the right to navigation and
fishing will remain unaffected. The act defines "outer continental shelf" as the submerged lands lying seaward and outside of
the lands granted to the states by and described in the Submerged
Lands Act "and of which the subsoil and sea bed appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." 80
Unlike the Truman Proclamation, the rights asserted in the Act
extend to the whole of the subsoil and sea bed and are not re30. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
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stricted to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed. In
this respect the Act appears to be at loggerheads with the traditional position taken by the United States in opposing any national claims that are broader than necessary to protect natural
resources. Although the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf does not forbid these broader claims, it directly sanctions
only those claims to jurisdiction and control for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting natural resources.
The Act sets up the machinery for leasing oil and gas rights
upon the payment of royalties. Other sections of the Act are concerned with administrative details. In addition to these provisions the Act extends the
Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States... to the subsoil and sea bed of
the outer continental shelf and to all artificial islands
and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and
transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as
if the outer continental shelf were an area of exclusive
Federal jurisdiction located within a state ....

31

Thus the Act applies the entire body of federal law to the sea bed
and subsoil of the shelf and to any artificial structures built on
the shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its resources. This provision of the Act most assuredly would seem to
be an extension of national sovereignty.
One deficiency in the Act is its failure to specifically provide
that the jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to artificial
structures on the shelf that are not built for the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources. Arguably these structures are
included under a subsection of the Act which deals with the
power of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstructions to
navigation. That subsection provides that:
The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent
obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of the
United States is hereby extended to artificial islands
and fixed structures located on the Continental Shelf.82
The implication is that the jurisdiction of the United States extends to non-resource exploitation structures only to the extent
that they create an obstruction to navigation.
31. Id. § 1333(a) (1).
32. Id. § 1333(f).
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One other problem stems from this same deficiency. The federal district courts are given original jurisdiction over cases concerning the exploring and exploiting of natural resouces.33 But
who has jurisdiction over cases involving the continental shelf
but not concerning natural resources?
E. United States v. Ray
The case of United States v. Ray 4 may provide the answers to
some of the above questions when it is ultimately decided. In
that case the United States Government brought suit against
Louis M. Ray and Acme General Contractors, Inc. asking for a
permanent injunction to restrain them from proceeding further
with the development of several coral reefs just outside the
United States' three mile territorial limit. The defendants Ray
and Acme were attempting to form an island on these reefs by
dredging up sand from the ocean floor and filling in the reefs.
Their intention was to establish what would amount to a sovereign
nation just off the coast of Florida that would be subject to no
national jurisdiction other than its own. The Atlantis Development Corporation, Ltd. intervened,8 5 and the case was heard in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. The threshold problem of subject matter jurisdiction
was dealt with in a separate unreported opinion.3 6 As was previously pointed out, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act gives
the federal district courts original jurisdiction over cases arising
from activities on the shelf involving "exploring for, developing,
removing or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources... . "37 The Act, however,
makes no provision for cases that involve the continental shelf
but do not involve natural resources. Here the district court held
that it had jurisdiction, apparently on the theory that the dredging operation constituted the development, removal, and transportation of natural resources.
Because the dispute here was between the United States and its
Nationals, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was determinative of the rights of the parties. Thus although the Continental Shelf Convention was used as a guide, the case was essentially
one involving the construction of a federal statute.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. § 1333(b).
294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
379 F2d 818 (5th Cir. 1965).
United States v. Ray (S.D. Fla., April 21, 1965).

37. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1964).
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The Government argued that under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act and an earlier statute" dealing with navigation,
the United States, through the Secretary of the Army, had the
right to regulate construction on the continental shelf. The navigation statute relied on by the government prohibited the obstruction of "the navigable capacity on any of the waters of the
United States...-*89 and provided that the Secretary of the
Army's authorization was necessary before any structure could be
built in the waters of the United States. The Government argued
that the operation of this navigation statute was extended to the
superjacent waters of the entire continental shelf by subsection
(f) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. As previously
seen, subsection (f) provides that:
The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent
obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of the
United States is extended to artificial islands and fixed
structures located on the outer continental shelf. 40
The intervenor argued, however, that subsection(f) extended
the authority of the Secretary of the Army only to those artificial islands and structures located on that part of the continental shelf within the territorial waters of the United States. The
intervenor's theory for limiting the operation of subsection (f)
to the territorial waters of the United States, although not
clearly set out in his trial memorandum, seemed to be that since
the United States had specifically disavowed any claim to the
superjacent waters of the outer continental shelf, the words,
"waters of the United States", contained in subsection (f), should
be read so as to exclude the superjacent waters of the Outer Continental Shelf.
The court rejected the intervenor's argument in favor of the
literal language of subsection (f). The decision here is in accord
with the legislative history of subsection (f) 4 1 and moreover, the
intervenor's position goes against common sense. The term
"outer continental shelf" by definition is outside the three mile
territorial limits of the United States.
Since subsection (f) is not limited to structures built for the
purpose of exploiting natural resources but rather is applicable
38. Id. § 403.

39. Id. § 403.
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964).
41. The bill when introduced contained no provision similar to subsection (f)
but the Senate Committee added the subsection after hearing testimony from

the Army Engineers that they were in fact exercising such jurisdiction with

good results in an area outside the three mile limit.
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to all structures, the intervenor's only remaining argument was
that this articifical island was not built on the sea bed itself and
thus was not "located on the continental shelf". In other words,
he argued that the term continental shelf is synonomous with sea
bed and subsoil and that the reefs are neither, but are instead outcroppings of coral that grew up from the floor of the sea. The
intervenor further argued that since the construction was taking
place atop these reefs, it could not be said that this development
was an "artificial island or fixed structure located on the outer
continental shelf." (Emphasis added) This line of reasoning is
intertwined with the concept of "horizontal jurisdiction"--the
idea that the rights of the coastal state run horizontally across
the continental shelf and not vertically. The district court rejected the argument of "horizontal jurisdiction" and found, as a
matter of fact, that the reefs were a portion of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf over which the United States had
jurisdiction and control.
The intervenor argued finally that since its activities were not
related to the exploration for or exploitation of the natural resources, the Federal Government had no authority over its activities. The court held, however, that:
[T]he reefs and their coral and piscatorial inhabitants
[are] natural resources not only as that term is understood by the general public, but as defined by law.
The caissons positioned by Ray and the jack platform
construction or "boathouse" built on pilings proposed by
Atlantis constitute "artificial islands and fixed structures ... erected ...for the purpose of developing" the
42
reefs, within the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Because of the large sums of money involved, 43 The Ray case
is almost certain to be appealed. Yet from the standpoint of national policy, one wonders whether the United States could
tolerate an adverse decision on the questions presented in the Ray
case. To permit independent sovereign nations to spring up just
three miles off our coast would present problems. These independent island nations might be used to subvert the public policies of the state and federal governments (e.g., gambling and
drug laws) and they might pose threats to national security.
42. 294 F. Supp. 532, 539 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
43. There was testimony at the trial that the island if completed would be
worth $1,000,000,000.00. 294 F. Supp. at 535.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

1970]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4

Noms

Should the Government lose on appeal, the Congress could
always amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to clear
up the ambiguities that precipitated the Ray case; however, grave constitutional questions would be presented if the
Congress attempted to apply the amendments retroactively to the
Ray defendants. Moreover, perhaps the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act was intentionally made ambiguous. The United States
has traditionally opposed any attempts by other nations to extend
their territorial waters. Thus the Congress was careful to avoid
any language in the Act that might be used by another country
as an excuse to extend its territorial limits. This same traditional
policy places the Government in an awkward position in the Ray
case; the Government must argue that its jurisdiction extends to
artificial islands in the superjacent waters of the continental shelf
and at the same time try to avoid setting a precedent that another
nation might use to extend its territorial jurisdiction. For example, a Chilean court, by analogy to Ray, might conclude that fish
constitute a natural resource of its continental shelf.
VI. CoNCLUSION

The doctrine of the continental shelf is an area of the law in
which more questions remain unanswered than are answered.
The answers to certain general questions, however, are clear. The
legal concept of the continental shelf is recognized although its
definition and bounds are not certain. It is also universally recognized that the coastal state has certain rights in its continental
shelf although there is no general agreement over the extent of
these rights. Also these rights are generally recognized to be exclusive, but there is no precise agreement as to which rights are
exclusive and which are not, and there is no general agreement
over the degree of exclusiveness to which each right is entitled.
In the United States, coastal states are given rights in the continental shelf up to a distance of three miles by statute. As to
the control of that area beyond this three mile limit, many questions remain unanswered. Again, the Federal Government exerts
some degree of authority in this area, but the exact extent to
which this authority runs and the precise degree of authority
exerted still remain unsettled.
J. MUNFoim SCOTT, JR.
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